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He has published widely in these fields as well as on migration and Kantian philosophy. Using sharp analytic tools Dr. Angeli exposes mercilessly the fallacies in the traditional treatment of issues including cosmopolitanism and self-determination. Under his view moral cosmopolitanism does not preclude territorial rights. This book challenges the most entrenched beliefs of contemporary political theorists and provides an original and a compelling alternative which will greatly influence contemporary discourse concerning the international order.
Angeli reconciles moral cosmopolitanism with rights of states to self-determination and shows how control over immigration and resources must be limited but can also be justified.
He writes with exceptional clarity and makes his argument accessible to a wide audience. In his clear-headed and historically erudite study, Oliviero Angeli identifies the challenges that arise for theories of political territoriality if we take seriously the universalistic idea of individuals as bearers of cosmopolitan rights. His substantive account shows why we should reject "liberal nationalist" views that rely on special ethical relations to territory, and instead embrace the value of democratic self-determination. Oliviero Angeli's deeply engaging and erudite monograph fills a major gap in the literature by illuminating the historical sources of recent controversies and by providing an elegant defence of democratic self-determination constrained by cosmopolitan norms.
However, the stability of borders principle relates only to international borders.
The question of the stability of internal state borders is not a matter within the ambit of international law. Second, even if it is accepted that upon international recognition these internal federal borders became international borders, the stability of borders principle would still be irrelevant. This is because the principle requires that the borders be determined by treaty or agreement. The second international law principle relied upon by the Badinter Commission in Opinion No 3 was that of uti possidetis. The principle, when applied, meant that former colonial borders became international borders of the newly independent states.
There are two versions of the uti possidetis principle. By uti possidetis juris , borders are defined according to legal rights of possession based upon the legal documents of the former colonial power at the time of independence. By uti possidetis de facto , borders are defined by territory actually possessed and administered by the former colonial unit at the time of independence, irrespective of the legal definition of former colonial borders.
Prior to the legally binding nature of the uti possidetis principle depended upon it being specifically fixed by treaty between the relevant states as the basis for resolving a border dispute. In the absence of such a specific stipulation the principle did not apply.
If a treaty was silent on the basis upon which a border dispute was to be resolved, the arbitral body could, but was not obliged to, apply the principle of uti possidetis juris. Since , following the decision of the International Court of Justice in Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali ,  a treaty need not explicitly stipulate that the principle of uti possidetis governs the resolution of a border dispute for that principle to apply. As to the principle of uti possidetis being a basis for the Badinter Borders Principle, the Badinter Commission stated the following in Opinion No 3 :.
However, it must be noted that the Badinter Commission selectively quoted from the decision in the Frontier Dispute Case. This point is made quite explicitly in other parts of the Frontier Dispute Case judgment. Nothing in the decision in the Frontier Dispute Case suggests that the principle of uti possidetis applies to cases of secession from internationally recognised states. The principle is not, as claimed by the Badinter Commission, recognised as a general principle applicable to all cases of independence.
First, it ignores the explicit and repeated references by the Court to uti possidetis juris applying specifically in the context of decolonisation. The discussion on the generality of the principle of uti possidetis juris was clearly in relation to its generality in the context of decolonisation.
It has been suggested that in the case of the SFRY the application of the uti possidetis juris principle was justified on the basis that its fragmentation amounted to a form of decolonisation,  and furthermore, that there was an agreement by its republics that internal federal borders were to be future internal borders. Lands not forming part of pre-World War I Serbia all made the decision to seek unification with Serbia after World War I to form the Yugoslav state,  and in all subsequent Yugoslav constitutions all citizens were subject to the same provisions.
A twin-track policy approach was agreed to. Its first provision was for certain measures to be taken in relation to the military circumstances on the ground. Secondly, there was a political aspect which stipulated:. The Hague Statement was made by the responsible EC representative who had acted as chairman of the meeting. It was not the subject of a formally executed document. In the absence of a formally executed document it cannot be said that the Hague Statement was legally binding upon the republics whose delegates were at the meeting.
Nor was it legally binding upon those republics not represented at the meeting. Even if the Hague Statement is accepted as having legal effect as from 4 October , it would no longer have been legally binding by the end of , by which time four republics had made applications for international recognition by the EC in the wake of the meeting of EC Foreign Ministers on 16 December , who had issued guidelines for international recognition for any Yugoslav republic seeking such recognition.
In effect, as at the end of , there was no basis upon which it could be argued that there was in place a legally binding agreement to the effect that the republics of the SFRY had agreed that pre-secession internal federal borders would be future international borders. Accordingly, there was no basis to argue that the Yugoslav republics had adopted the principle of uti possidetis juris. Indeed, the move by the EC to recognise the republics effectively ruled out the possibility of any general settlement on the Yugoslav crisis being negotiated without the use of force or coercion.
A final comment on the issue of whether the principle of uti possidetis juris is a justified basis for the Badinter Borders Principle relates to its function in the context of border disputes following decolonisation. In Latin America and Africa the function of uti possidetis juris was to provide a mutually agreeable means of resolving disputes that were fundamentally different from the disputes that arose in the context of the secessions of republics from the SFRY. In Latin America and Africa, when the principle of uti possidetis juris was applied, there was no dispute that the former colonial borders would be future international borders.
The principle of uti possidetis juris was applied in the arbitration process to resolve differences between neighbouring states who could not agree on the exact location of colonial border lines. In the SFRY there was never any dispute about the location of the exact border lines between the various republics at the time of secession. What was in dispute was the question of whether these lines should be future international borders. Agreement that existing colonial borders were to be international borders was a precondition to the application of uti possidetis juris in the decolonisation context in Latin America and Africa.cars.cleantechnica.com/tarde-o-temprano-nos-abrazaremos.php
Cosmopolitanism, Self-Determination and Territory
The principle of uti possidetis juris was not relevant to the resolution of a dispute as to whether existing colonial borders should be future international borders. Thus, in the context of the SFRY, the principle of uti possidetis juris was of no relevance, given that the issue in dispute was not the location of internal federal borders, but rather, whether they should be future international borders. If the internal federal borders of the SFRY were to be future international borders, the principle of uti possidetis juris was irrelevant because the location of those borders was not in dispute.
Apart from principles of international law, the Badinter Commission sought to justify the relevance of the Badinter Borders Principle by reference to article 5 of the Constitution of the SFRY The Commission said that the Badinter Borders Principle. In referring to article 5, the Badinter Commission was again guilty of selective quoting. Article 5 stipulates:.
In relying on paragraphs 2 and 4 of article 5, the Badinter Commission ignored the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 3. In doing so it was justifying the division of the SFRY and the alteration of its international borders in violation of paragraphs 1 and 3. Furthermore, it can be argued that the territorial integrity of republics and the sanctity of their borders referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of article 5 only applied in the context of the Yugoslav state whose own territorial integrity and borders remained in place.
A republic seeking to violate the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 3 of article 5 could hardly reap the guarantees contained within paragraphs 2 and 4. Based upon the above analysis of the reasoning of the Badinter Commission in Opinion No 3 it can be concluded that neither the international law principles of respect for the territorial status quo and uti possidetis nor the provisions of article 5 of the Constitution of the SFRY provides any justification for the Badinter Borders Principle. Even if one rejects the legal reasoning of the Badinter Commission, it is nevertheless legitimate to question whether or not there are other reasons which justify the Badinter Borders Principle.
It has been suggested that, apart from the reasoning of the Badinter Commission in Opinion No 3 , such other reasons do exist. The authors of the Quebec Report took the view that international practice in the wake of recent secessions supported the Badinter Borders Principle approach. It can also be noted that there has been considerable condemnation of the approach taken by the EC in recognising the former Yugoslav republics as independent states within existing federal borders. No convincing reasons were given for the maintenance of internal borders as international borders, apart from the unacceptability of the use of force to change them.